The United States has a president who won a modest victory in the popular vote but whose campaign posture and the reality under which he took office have diverged substantially. He has been drawn, whether by inclination or necessity, to the portion of his presidency where he is [institutionally] weakest [i.e. domestic policy] and most likely to face resistance and defeat. And the weaker he gets politically the less likely he is to get domestic legislation passed, and the defeats will increase his weakness.
Presidents [can] go into opposition when they lose support in Congress. They run campaigns against Congress for blocking their agenda and blame Congress for any failures. Essentially, this was Bill Clinton’s strategy after his reversals in 1994, and it worked in 1996. It is a risky strategy, obviously. The other option is to shift from the weak part of the presidency to the strong part, foreign policy, where a president can generally act decisively without congressional backing. If Congress does resist, it can be painted as playing politics with national security.Friedman argues that the second option is politically unattractive because the Republicans practically own the national security issue. Yet The One cannot escape it - he has a war going south in Afghanistan, and any prospect of a settlement there, or of a successful legacy in Iraq, involves dealing with the inveterate shit-stirrers in Tehran (my terminology, not Friedman's).
Diplomatic strokes appeal to Obama. They also would appeal to his political base, while any agreement with Iran that would contribute to an American withdrawal from Iraq and perhaps from Afghanistan would appeal to the center. The Republicans would be appalled, but Obama can’t win them over anyway so it doesn’t matter. Indeed, he can use their hostility to strengthen his own base.I'm not so sure The One can't run against Congress to advantage. The Republican establishment is in a mess of its own making and is facing a full-blown insurgency from the Tea Party phenomenon.
What the settlement with Iran might look like is murky at best. Whether Iran has any interest in such a settlement is murkier still. But if Obama gets hammered in the midterms, his domestic agenda will be frozen. He doesn’t have the personal strength and credibility to run against Congress for two years and then get re-elected. He retains his power in foreign affairs but he has not gotten traction on a multilateral reconstruction of America’s global popularity. He has two wars ongoing, plus a major challenge from Iran. Attacking Iran from the air might or might not work, and it could weaken him politically. That leaves him with running against Congress or addressing the Middle East with a diplomatic masterstroke.
But I am sure that Tehran has no interest in making a deal with the Great Satan. There is no possibility of a deal when the minimum demand on both sides is greater than the maximum concession either can make.
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